Publications and Papers

​  Published 

Unfollowed Rules and the Normativity of Content (Analytic Philosophy, 2019) 
Kathrin Gluer-Pagin and Asa Wikforss argue that what they call content-determining normativism must be false, because any theory that holds that norms determine content is subject to a dilemma of regress and idleness. I argue that this dilemma does not show that content-determining normativism is false, but rather shows that it must reject a match between norms that apply to a thinker's usage and rules that the thinker follows. In essence, content-determining normativism is idle in the way that Gluer-Pagin and Wikforss contend, but in a way that is harmless for the theory, suitably developed in an objective direction.


  in Progress 

Unconventional Meanings
I argue that the core condition of conventionalism about meaning, that there be a regularity in the use of any meaningful expression, is false for a range of natural language expressions. This is true under a variety of interpretations of the regularities cited in the core conventionalist condition. If none of these regularities are necessary for meaningful language use, then conventionalism about meaning cannot be true. 

Anti-Individualism and Metasemantics
I explain the problems that anti-individualism poses for constructing an adequate metasemantics for conceptual representation. I argue that a normative metasemantics can succeed where non-normative metasemantics fail in the light of anti-individualism. I explain how the resulting approach differs from more common arguments for the normativity of meaning and content associated with Kripke and Wittgenstein. I then take stock of the advantages and disadvantages of what I call an objective norm-based metasemantics over the rivals.  

The Slur Problem for Normative Theories of Content
A normative theory of content, as it is usually conceived, requires that for any concept's individuating profile, there is a corresponding package of normative facts prescribing conformity with that profile for any thinker who possesses the concept. The clearest potential counterexample to this requirement is posed by slur terms and, on certain accounts, the concepts they express. I argue that even an objective norm-based metasemantics for concepts has the resources to explain slur concepts, despite the moral and epistemic badness of their canonical patterns of use. 

Gibbard's Metatheory of Meaning
Allan Gibbard has recently developed a fascinating normative theory of meaning and content. He proposes a novel way of understanding and explaining the normative insights to be taken from Kripke's Wittgenstein. However, as I argue, Gibbard's own normative theory, to the extent that it can be interpreted as a genuine norm-based theory of content (and not, in Gibbard's terms, a "mere metatheory"), cannot fully explain the sorts of underdetermination of content by a thinker's internal states noted by Kripke and others. This is so both because of how Gibbard reframes the Kripkean data and because he relies on the subjective oughts of rationality to explain content in normative terms. 

Isn't Ought Enough? Duties, Norms, and the Theory of Content
I argue that the model of content normativity given by the discussion resulting from what's become known as Kripke's "Simple Argument" from content to normativity is overly narrow. I show that there are other ways of construing the normative facts relevant to the constitution of intentional facts and content-bearing relations that are more plausible, chiefly what I call a "directed dispositions" model, which takes more the shape of imperfect rather than perfect duties. The model shows that we are not committed to the implausible construal of content normativity given by the standard universally quantified, detachable prescriptions directing particular types of behavior.

Intrusion and Interlocution: Oppression in Conceptual Structure
If there are moral facts about which concepts we ought to deploy, then we plausibly have obligations to manage our own conceptual repertoires. We do not seem to have much negative influence over our store of concepts. However, most foundational theories of content are designed, in part, to explain the dependence of one thinker's conceptual repertoires on others. This paper explores some of the normative issues that arise in light of our ability to influence others' conceptual repertoires, identifying this kind of influence as one element of what makes certain forms of hateful speech and propaganda peculiarly perverse. 

Berkeley and Wittgenstein on Skepticism
I focus on Berkeley's discussion of skepticism as it related to his ideas concerning matter, bodies, and ordinary ontological categories in the Principles. Using Wittgenstein's treatment of Moorean anti-skepticism in On Certainty, along with Austin's and Stroud's discussions of linguistic responses to skepticism, as points of comparison, I argue that Berkeley both anticipated key aspects of their central moves and articulated a more plausible version than either. In doing so, I show how Berkeley's philosophy of language and mind led to a principled defense of common sense, but without relying on any particular theory of the meaning of epistemic terms. 

Berkeley's Linguistic Philosophy
I construct an interpretation of Berkeley's critical metaphilosophy as it arises from his views about representation and his philosophy of language. I draw particular connections to Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy, though I argue that Berkeley's metaphysical emphasis signals the relative plausibility of his linguistic metaphilosophy as compared with Wittgenstein's. I focus on his discussion of "body" and "sameness" in the Principles and the Dialogues, respectively, to develop and refine these connections. 

Anti-Realism, Expressivism, and Berkeley
As Flew observed, Berkeley's treatment of algebraic terms anticipates Wittgenstein's use theory of meaning. From this starting point, I build a case that Berkeley's thinking about language, philosophy, and metaphysics prefigured central moves in twentieth century philosophy of language, particularly those associated with expressivism and quasi-realism in metaethics, including those influenced by minimalism about truth. I contend that we ought to credit Berkeley alongside Wittgenstein as the originator of some of these central insights and theoretical possibilities inspiring anti-representationalist or anti-realist theories in the philosophy of language. This challenges the standard narrative according to which Hume is the primary originator of these moves in the philosophy of language.

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